In a recent article entitled, Requests 'for inappropriate" treatment based on religious beliefs,'
1. "Persistent requests based on deeply held religious beliefs should most often be honoured."2 2. "Treatment which the physician considers 'inappropriate' for some individuals when based purely on personal preference may, in fact, be 'appropriate' when based on a patient's religious belief."' They give no argument for these claims except to assert that religious values are special because they deal with the meaning of life and death4 and they cite Wreen's earlier assertions that religious values are special because they have a "supremely important integrating and reconciling function".'
This short reply argues that these claims are an example of religious prejudice and special pleading which is offensive to atheists and treats them as second-class citizens.
The authors stipulate that other faith traditions are outside the scope of their article. But why?
Unless the authors also believe that there is something special about these religions, one can only suspect that they are simply attempting to appeal to intuitions shared by many readers of these faith traditions. Consider the following three pairs of cases: 1 a. An African woman requests infibulation -the excision of her clitoris and sewing together of her labia -because this is a part of her cultural tradition. lb. A Greek woman requests that her labia be sewn together because her husband believes he will gain more pleasure from sexual intercourse with her that way and she desperately wants to please him. 2a. A three-year-old girl is involved in a car accident and is diagnosed as being brain dead.
Her parents refuse to allow her to be taken off the ventilator because according to their religious tradition, a person is dead when the heart and lungs have stopped working, and nothing further can be done. If the authors are saying anything novel, they must be saying that we should treat the patient in la, 2a, 3a, but not in at least one of lb, 2b, 3b insofar as the latter are based on mere "personal preferences". My claim is that there is no reason to treat la, 2a, 3a any differently from lb, 2b, 3b. If one person receives treatment with a one in a million chance, there is prima facie reason to believe that any person with a one in a million chance is entitled to treatment, regardless of her reasons for wanting treatment and motivations.
Principle of equality
According to Aristotle's Principle of Equality, we should treat like cases alike, unless there is a relevant difference. What could the relevant difference be between patients in these pairs of cases? The fact that one has a religious reason and the other does not is not a relevant difference. This gives special treatment to theists for no good reason. This is a form of discrimination, religious prejudice. On the authors' scheme, those who hold irrational and false beliefs receive preferential treatment over those who hold what atheists believe to be true beliefs. Those who are motivated by adherence to a Judaeo-Christian religious code are given preference over those motivated by self-interest that happens not to be religiously supported.
According to the objectivist view of reasons which I hold, whether a person should be offered a treatment turns on the objective values of the physical circumstances of that person's situation, such as the chance of prolonging a life in which a person can carry on worthwhile relationships with others, achieve worthwhile goals, and so on. Given that there are no differences in objective values promoted or not promoted in each pair of my imaginary cases, there is no reason to prefer the religiously motivated requests.
According to a subjectivist account of reasons, whether a person should be offered treatment would turn on the degree to which that person values that treatment or the degree to which treatment promotes his subjective values. However, again, there is no reason to give preference to religious values over non-religious values per se. Nonreligious values can perform the same "integrating and reconciling" function in atheist lives as religious values can perform for theists.
Appeal to miracles If anything, there is less reason to respect religious requests that are based on irrational beliefs. The irrationality of the religious beliefs in these examples is most clearly seen in the case of the woman who expects a miracle (3a). When someone says: "God will cure my leukaemia with this bone marrow transplantation", she is making an empirical claim that is either true or false. Let's assume that her doctors believe it is false. Either she is right or they are right. Since there is no good reason to believe that her leukaemia will be cured, her belief is irrational and likely false. The appeal to miracles is also inconsistent with the central tenets of Christian faith. Firstly, predicting that a miracle will occur presumes that the person knows God's will. Secondly, God has supposedly raised people from the dead so death should be no obstacle to a miracle occurring.
The call to give religious belief special treatment arises from a serious confusion about the relationship between religion and ethics. Religion and ethics are different categories of human enquiry. Religion is as different from ethics as it is from mathematics. 
